On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 116
Issue: 3
Pages: 504-507

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The ratio of within-group to between-group fighting is shown to be unrealistically high for the collective rent seeking model when agents exert two efforts i.e. within-group and between-group efforts. The ratio is more realistic for the production and conflict model. Six economics examples illustrate the unrealistic implications of rent seeking analysis.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:504-507
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25