The strategic interaction between the government and international oil companies in the UK: An example of a country with dwindling hydrocarbon reserves

B-Tier
Journal: Energy Policy
Year: 2013
Volume: 57
Issue: C
Pages: 276-286

Authors (2)

Willigers, Bart J.A. (not in RePEc) Hausken, Kjell (Universitetet i Stavanger)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The 2011 UK tax rise on hydrocarbon exploitation activities obviously increases short term tax revenues however the longer term effects are less clear. The strategic interaction between the UK government, a producer and a shipper has been analyzed in a game theoretical model. A complex interaction between players is expected given (1) dwindling resources and large decommissioning liabilities and (2) the fact that much of the hydrocarbons produced in the North Sea are exported through an infrastructure with shared ownership.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:enepol:v:57:y:2013:i:c:p:276-286
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25