Institutional ‘gaming’ involving staff turnover during recent research evaluation exercises by UK Russell Group universities

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
Year: 2025
Volume: 77
Issue: 2
Pages: 427-444

Authors (3)

Richard Harris (Durham University) Mariluz Mate-Sanchez-Val (not in RePEc) Manuel Ruiz Marín (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

There is limited evidence on the extent to which UK universities institutionally ‘game’ the system with respect to periodic research assessment exercises (i.e. RAE/REF), that is, the hiring (and leaving) of staff before the cut-off census date to enhance institutional returns. Population panel data from the Higher Educational Statistical Agency (HESA) for 2004/05–2019/20 are used to consider the extent to which the numbers of ‘starters’, ‘movers’, and ‘exits’ specifically responded to the RAE/REF cycle. Confining the analysis to full professors, a random effects (RE) multinomial logit model was estimated that shows, after taking account of the importance of other covariates, strong evidence of a 2008 and (in particular) 2014 cycle, but no evidence of any upturn in overall hires (or declines in exiting) in the period preceding the 2021 REF census date. Institutional ‘gaming’ therefore seems to have been absent during the most recent REF.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxecpp:v:77:y:2025:i:2:p:427-444.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25