Taxes and Benefits: Two Options to Cheat on the State

B-Tier
Journal: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2014
Volume: 76
Issue: 3
Pages: 411-431

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="obes12024-abs-0001"> <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>In this article we study the social norms to abstain from cheating on the state via benefit fraud and tax evasion. We interpret these norms (called benefit morale and tax morale) as moral goods, and derive testable hypotheses on whether their demand is determined by prices. Employing a large survey data set from OECD-member countries we provide robust evidence that the demand responds to price proxy variables as predicted by theory. The main general conclusion of this article is that social norms (which are widely accepted as determinants of individual economic behaviour) are themselves influenced by economic factors.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:obuest:v:76:y:2014:i:3:p:411-431
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25