Choice by sequential procedures

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 77
Issue: 1
Pages: 90-99

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:90-99
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24