Strategic delegation and voting rules

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 94
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 102-113

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition. A larger majority requirement leads to "conservative" delegation and hence a status quo bias; a poor minority protection does the opposite. Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:102-113
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25