Subjective Bayesian beliefs

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Year: 2015
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Pages: 35-54

Authors (4)

Constantinos Antoniou (not in RePEc) Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University) Morten Lau (Copenhagen Business School) Daniel Read (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A large literature suggests that many individuals do not apply Bayes’ Rule when making decisions that depend on them correctly pooling prior information and sample data. We replicate and extend a classic experimental study of Bayesian updating from psychology, employing the methods of experimental economics, with careful controls for the confounding effects of risk aversion. Our results show that risk aversion significantly alters inferences on deviations from Bayes’ Rule. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:jrisku:v:50:y:2015:i:1:p:35-54
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25