Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1997
Volume: 105
Issue: 3
Pages: 609-21

Authors (4)

Cummings, Ronald G (not in RePEc) Elliott, Steven (not in RePEc) Harrison, Glenn W (Georgia State University) Murphy, James (University of West Georgia)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive-compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. The authors employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Their results lead them to reject that hypothesis. Coauthors are Steven Elliott, Glenn W. Harrison, and James Murphy. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:3:p:609-21
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25