The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in oligopolistic industries

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2012
Volume: 36
Issue: 4
Pages: 585-609

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper embeds an oligopolistic industry structure in a real options framework in which synergy gains of horizontal mergers arise endogenously and vary stochastically over time. We find that (i) mergers are more likely in more concentrated industries; (ii) mergers are more likely in industries that are more exposed to industry-wide shocks; (iii) returns to merger and rival firms arising from restructuring are higher in more concentrated industries; (iv) increased industry competition delays the timing of mergers; (v) in sufficiently concentrated industries, bidder competition induces a bid premium that declines with product market competition; and (vi) mergers are more likely and yield larger returns in industries with higher dispersion in firm size.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:4:p:585-609
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25