Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2007
Volume: 39
Issue: 5
Pages: 1067-1105

Authors (3)

ELENA CARLETTI (not in RePEc) PHILIPP HARTMANN (European Central Bank) GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:39:y:2007:i:5:p:1067-1105
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25