Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the underpricing of initial public offerings

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 103
Issue: 2
Pages: 235-254

Authors (2)

Hanley, Kathleen Weiss (Lehigh University) Hoberg, Gerard (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using word content analysis on the time-series of IPO prospectuses, we show that issuers tradeoff underpricing and strategic disclosure as potential hedges against litigation risk. This tradeoff explains a significant fraction of the variation in prospectus revision patterns, IPO underpricing, the partial adjustment phenomenon, and litigation outcomes. We find that strong disclosure is an effective hedge against all types of lawsuits. Underpricing, however, is an effective hedge only against Section 11 lawsuits, those lawsuits which are most damaging to the underwriter. Underwriters who fail to adequately hedge litigation risk experience economically large penalties, including loss of market share.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:103:y:2012:i:2:p:235-254
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25