Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2021
Volume: 71
Issue: 3
Pages: 1161-1187

Authors (3)

Peter J. Hammond (University of Warwick) Lei Qiao (not in RePEc) Yeneng Sun (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Monte Carlo simulation is used in Hammond and Sun (Econ Theory 36:303–325, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0279-7 ) to characterize a standard stochastic framework involving a continuum of random variables that are conditionally independent given macro shocks. This paper presents some general properties of such Monte Carlo sampling processes, including their one-way Fubini extension and regular conditional independence. In addition to the almost sure convergence of Monte Carlo simulation considered in Hammond and Sun (2008), here we also consider norm convergence when the random variables are square integrable. This leads to a necessary and sufficient condition for the classical law of large numbers to hold in a general Hilbert space. Applying this analysis to large economies with asymmetric information shows that the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved asymptotically for almost all sampling economies, following some similar results in McLean and Postlewaite (Econometrica 70:2421–2453, 2002) and Sun and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 134:175–194, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001 ).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:71:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01318-5
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25