Bonus-Driven Repurchases

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2015
Volume: 50
Issue: 3
Pages: 447-475

Authors (3)

Cheng, Yingmei (not in RePEc) Harford, Jarrad (University of Washington) Zhang, Tianming (Tim) (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:50:y:2015:i:03:p:447-475_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25