Do insiders time management buyouts and freezeouts to buy undervalued targets?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 131
Issue: 1
Pages: 206-231

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the 12-month period following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk factors or empirical methodologies, but exhibit significant heterogeneity across deals. Additional tests show that, on average, abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Further, MBOs and freezeouts are announced during troughs of industry profitability.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:131:y:2019:i:1:p:206-231
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25