The timing of retirement — New evidence from Swiss female workers

B-Tier
Journal: Labour Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 19
Issue: 5
Pages: 718-728

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate the responsiveness of individual retirement decisions to changes in financial incentives. A reform increased women's normal retirement age (NRA) in two steps from age 62 to age 63 first and then to age 64. At the same time retirement at the previous NRA became possible at a benefit discount. Since the reform affected specific birth cohorts we can identify causal effects. We find strong and robust behavioral effects of changes in financial retirement incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4% induces a decline in the age-specific annual retirement probability by over 50%. The response to changes in financial retirement benefits varies with educational background: those with low education respond most strongly to an increase in the price of leisure.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:5:p:718-728
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25