Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2007
Volume: 25
Issue: 4
Pages: 613-650

Authors (3)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using unique panel data on production lines in U.S. minimills, we analyze the adoption of problem-solving teams and group incentive pay and their effects on productivity. Almost every line ultimately adopts group incentives. However, problem-solving teams are found almost exclusively in lines with more complex production processes. Consistent with these patterns, fixed-effects models reveal increased productivity under group incentives in all lines, while teams raise productivity in lines with more complex production processes. This evidence indicates that teams give workers a valuable opportunity to solve problems in more complex production processes, while standard operating procedures appear to suffice elsewhere.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:25:y:2007:p:613-650
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25