Time Allocation and Task Juggling

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 2
Pages: 609-23

Authors (3)

Decio Coviello (not in RePEc) Andrea Ichino (Alma Mater Studiorum - Univers...) Nicola Persico (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon "task juggling" and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others'.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:2:p:609-23
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25