Prudence as a competitive advantage: On the effects of competition on banks' risk-taking incentives

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 60
Issue: C
Pages: 127-143

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper builds on the notion that corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank's operations as their continued access to credit may depend on the bank's ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. A key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks' incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:60:y:2013:i:c:p:127-143
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25