Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics
Year: 2008
Volume: 11
Issue: 1
Pages: 220-236

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A seller owning a single, indivisible asset faces the random arrival of privately informed buyers, with whom he can bargain sequentially. Our key result is that despite the arrival of alternative buyers the Coase conjecture continues to hold under stationary strategies if the distribution

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:red:issued:06-104
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25