A test of stability in a linear altruism model

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 121
Issue: 1
Pages: 85-89

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:1:p:85-89
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25