Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2011
Volume: 101
Issue: 3
Pages: 509-13

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:509-13
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25