Bank-Specific Default Risk in the Pricing of Bank Note Discounts

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 2011
Volume: 71
Issue: 4
Pages: 950-975

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Bank notes were the largest component of the antebellum money supply despite losses as high as 5 percent in some years. Using a comprehensive bank-level panel of note discounts in New York City and Philadelphia, I explain this contradiction by showing that the secondary market reduced losses by accurately discounting notes based on their individual risk of default. Note discounts were almost exclusively sensitive to those factors which increased a bank's probability of default: specie suspensions, falling bond prices, and undiversified portfolios. Thus, by accounting for a bank's composition and environment, the market protected noteholders and allowed notes to circulate throughout the economy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:71:y:2011:i:04:p:950-975_00
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25