Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2018
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Pages: 173-201

Authors (4)

HAELIM ANDERSON (not in RePEc) CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS (not in RePEc) MATTHEW JAREMSKI (Utah State University) GARY RICHARDSON (University of California-Irvin...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:50:y:2018:i:1:p:173-201
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25