CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2015
Volume: 70
Issue: 5
Pages: 2155-2184

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand-collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90-super-th to the 10-super-th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:5:p:2155-2184
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25