Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2021
Volume: 34
Issue: 2
Pages: 569-617

Authors (2)

Dirk Jenter (Centre for Economic Policy Res...) Katharina Lewellen (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper revisits the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Instead of classifying turnovers into forced and voluntary, we introduce performance-induced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been “good.” We document a close turnover-performance link and estimate that 38%–55% of turnovers are performance induced. This is significantly more than the number of forced turnovers, though the two types of turnovers are highly correlated. Compared to the predictions of Bayesian learning models, learning about CEO ability appears to be slow, and boards act as if CEO ability (or match quality) was subject to frequent shocks.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:34:y:2021:i:2:p:569-617.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25