Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2001
Volume: 91
Issue: 1
Pages: 240-259

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argue that industrial use of federally funded research would be reduced without university patent licensing. Our survey of U.S. universities supports this view, emphasizing the embryonic state of most technologies licensed and the need for inventor cooperation in commercialization. Thus, for most university inventions, there is a moral-hazard problem with inventor effort. For such inventions, development does not occur unless the inventor's income is tied to the licensee's output by payments such as royalties or equity. Sponsored research from the licensee cannot by itself solve this problem.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:1:p:240-259
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25