Payoff-Based Belief Distortion

A-Tier
Journal: Economic Journal
Year: 2020
Volume: 130
Issue: 629
Pages: 1416-1444

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Heterogeneous beliefs often arise among people with the same information but different personally experienced payoffs. To explain this, I propose a mechanism in which experienced payoffs distort beliefs: gains lead an agent to relatively underweight negative new signals and thus to become overoptimistic, whereas losses do the opposite. I experimentally test this mechanism and find behaviour consistent with its predictions. The experiment created a setting where payoffs carried no informational value for Bayesian updating, and thus offered a strong test for the effect of payoffs on beliefs. The findings were robust, and distinct from alternative mechanisms in important ways.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:629:p:1416-1444.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25