Political connections and short sellers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2023
Volume: 146
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Jia, Yuecheng (Central University of Finance) Simkins, Betty (not in RePEc) Feng, Hongrui (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study finds that politically connected firms, comparing with their non–connected peers, are less likely to be targeted by short sellers, especially during the periods of market turmoil. Short sellers’ avoidance of politically connected firms can be attributed to the implicit government guarantee, which significantly increases the target firms’ information complexity and decreases short sellers’ expected risk–adjusted profits. The absence of short sellers consequently results in less negative stock returns for politically connected firms as compared to their non–connected peers. Our findings extend Boehmer et al.(2010) by showing that the absence of short sellers may not necessarily indicate good news but can be attributed to the presence of political connections. This study sheds some light on the sources of market value of political connections.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:146:y:2023:i:c:s0378426622002837
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25