Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2008
Volume: 63
Issue: 4
Pages: 1679-1728

Authors (3)

KOSE JOHN (New York University (NYU)) LUBOMIR LITOV (not in RePEc) BERNARD YEUNG (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value‐enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk‐avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk‐taking for their self‐interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk‐taking. Using a cross‐country panel and a U.S.‐only sample, we find that corporate risk‐taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:4:p:1679-1728
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25