Are hedge fund managers systematically misreporting? Or not?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 111
Issue: 2
Pages: 311-327

Authors (2)

Jorion, Philippe (University of California-Irvin...) Schwarz, Christopher (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity and the bounding of yields at zero can generate distribution discontinuities as well. Therefore, we conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of manipulation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:111:y:2014:i:2:p:311-327
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25