Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 110
Issue: 11
Pages: 3431-53

Authors (4)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:11:p:3431-53
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24