Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2022
Volume: 132
Issue: C
Pages: 255-273

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings for a many-to-many matching market. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two natural binary operations for computing the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two distributive lattices for the appropriate partial order, one for each side of the market. Moreover, these lattices are dual.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:255-273
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25