Conjectural variations, symmetric equilibria and economic policy

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Modeling
Year: 2009
Volume: 26
Issue: 5
Pages: 1115-1120

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper, we consider conjectural variations in a simple static general equilibrium model under oligopolistic competition. The modeling of conjectures captures the role played by beliefs in a micro-founded model. So, the economy may have three kinds of symmetric general equilibria. Furthermore, these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the conjectural variation parameter. Finally, we consider the implementation of a tax on the strategic behaviors in case of balanced-budget rule. The comparative statics illustrates the idea according to which the effectiveness of the multiplier mechanism to mitigate the market distortions depends on the symmetric equilibrium considered. Therefore, the effect of the tax on the prices and economic activity depends on the degree of market power which is conjectured by the agents.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecmode:v:26:y:2009:i:5:p:1115-1120
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25