Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2024
Volume: 132
Issue: 7
Pages: 2346 - 2395

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729068
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25