Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2002
Volume: 19
Issue: 1
Pages: 63-103

Authors (2)

Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (not in RePEc) Mamoru Kaneko (Waseda University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Individual decision making is based on predictions about other players' choices as well as on valuations of reactions to predictions. In this sense, a player has a prediction-decision criterion for decision making. We develop a theory of prediction-decision criteria, which enables us to capture new phenomena on individual decision making in games. The decision making situation is described in the epistemic logic GL$_{EF}$ of shallow depths. There, each player considers his and other players' decision making down to some shallow depths. It is a point of our theory to investigate inferential complexities of interpersonal introspections. In particular, we can discuss a minimal epistemic inferential structure for prediction-decision making. We will find parallel structures in decision making and prediction making, which is called an inner parallelism. The climax of the paper is the consideration of inner parallelisms of prediction-decision making.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:63-103
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25