Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects when lies can be delegated

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 74
Issue: C
Pages: 70-78

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this study we want to find out how people behave in a situation where they can themselves lie or they can share the responsibility for lying with others. To answer this question we study a sender-receiver game followed by a dictator game. It is possible to delegate the act of lying in the sender-receiver game and take pro-social actions in the subsequent dictator game. We examine how delegation affects the outcomes of current and future ethical decisions. We find that a non-trivial fraction of participants delegate their decision and delegation is associated with higher transfers in the subsequent dictator game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:70-78
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25