Rationally Inattentive Monetary Policy

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics
Year: 2023
Volume: 48
Pages: 265-296

Authors (2)

Joshua Bernstein (not in RePEc) Rupal Kamdar (Indiana University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies optimal monetary policy under rational inattention: the policy maker optimally chooses her information subject to a processing constraint. Our analytical results emphasize how the policy maker's information choices shape her expectations and the dynamics of the macroeconomy. Paying attention to demand shocks lowers output volatility and causes untracked supply shocks to drive inflation. Because persistent supply shocks have a minor impact on interest rates under full information in the New Keynesian model, the policy maker should bias her limited attention towards demand shocks. Improvements in information can explain a declining slope of the empirical Phillips curve. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:red:issued:21-236
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25