Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2019
Volume: 28
Issue: 1
Pages: 138-152

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:1:p:138-152
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25