Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations, and Unemployment Outcomes

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1990
Volume: 105
Issue: 4
Pages: 973-1002

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff-rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the United States. We find that the spells of individuals' who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients than do spells actually ending in recall. Our results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables. We also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that UI benefits lapse.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:4:p:973-1002.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25