Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 4
Pages: 114-45

Authors (2)

David J. Cooper (not in RePEc) John H. Kagel

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams' decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:114-45
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25