Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 124
Issue: 2
Pages: 274-277

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait Agreeableness. A one standard deviation increase in agreeableness increases the predicted probability of cooperation by a subject with modal demographic characteristics from 67.9% to 80.6%.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:274-277
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25