Cooperation through communication: Teams and individuals in finitely repeated Prisoners’ dilemma games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2018
Volume: 146
Issue: C
Pages: 55-64

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95–100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can achieve, with minimal discussion of punishment for failing to cooperate. Restoring cooperation after an early stage-game defection typically requires compensating the aggrieved agent.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:146:y:2018:i:c:p:55-64
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25