Minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets: An experimental investigation

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2010
Volume: 73
Issue: 3
Pages: 317-326

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A minimum wage raises average wages along with modest increases in employees' average effort levels, generating a Pareto improvement in social welfare. The minimum wage reduces effort in the neighborhood of the minimum, but has no systematic effect on effort levels at higher wages. As a consequence average effort increases modestly with a minimum wage as it raises average wages. Similar results are reported within groups, both when introducing and eliminating a minimum wage, although the within group effects of introducing a minimum wage are stronger than dropping it.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:3:p:317-326
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25