Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1994
Volume: 102
Issue: 3
Pages: 583-606

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Self-reporting--the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority--is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, such as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. The authors add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement and they characterize the optimal scheme. Self-reporting offers two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected and risk is reduced because individuals who report their behavior bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:3:p:583-606
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25