Chasing Private Information

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2019
Volume: 32
Issue: 12
Pages: 4997-5047

Authors (2)

Marcin Kacperczyk (Imperial College) Emiliano S Pagnotta (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using over 5,000 trades unequivocally based on nonpublic information about firm fundamentals, we find that asymmetric information proxies display abnormal values on days with informed trading. Volatility and volume are abnormally high, whereas illiquidity is low, in equity and option markets. Daily returns reflect the sign of private signals, but bid-ask spreads are lower when informed investors trade. Market makers’ learning under event uncertainty and limit orders help explain these findings. The cross-section of information duration indicates that traders select days with high uninformed volume. Evidence from the U.S. SEC Whistleblower Reward Program and the FINRA involvement addresses selection concerns.Received January 11, 2017; editorial decision December 17, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:12:p:4997-5047.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25