Loose knots: Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 174
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Karlan, Dean (Northwestern University) Linden, Leigh L. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:174:y:2025:i:c:s0304387824001937
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25