Executive compensation and the cost of debt

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2013
Volume: 37
Issue: 8
Pages: 2893-2907

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study examines how different components of executive compensation affect the cost of debt. We find that debt-like and equity-like pay components have differing effects: an increase in defined benefit pensions is associated with lower bond yield spread, while higher share holdings lead to higher spreads. In addition, we find that stock options have a mixed impact on the cost of debt whereas cash bonus has no significant impact. Overall, our results indicate that corporate bondholders are fully aware of both risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives created by various executive pay components.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:8:p:2893-2907
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25