Lying about luck versus lying about performance

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2018
Volume: 153
Issue: C
Pages: 194-199

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I compare lying behavior in a real-effort task in which participants have control over outcomes and a task in which outcomes are determined by pure luck. Participants lie significantly more in the random-draw task than in the real-effort task, leading to the conclusion lying about luck is intrinsically less costly than lying about performance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:153:y:2018:i:c:p:194-199
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25