Employment Protection and Product Market Competition

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2006
Volume: 108
Issue: 2
Pages: 339-352

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:2:p:339-352
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25