Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Growth
Year: 1999
Volume: 4
Issue: 2
Pages: 185-211

Authors (4)

Clague, Christopher (not in RePEc) Keefer, Philip (Inter-American Development Ban...) Knack, Stephen Olson, Mancur (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called "contract-intensive money" or CIM, is based on citizens' decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:jecgro:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:185-211
Journal Field
Growth
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25